423
619
622
565

urimi group as a whole from which the aristocrats is "granted" his yearly share, while in other cases they are his personal possessions, inherited through the male family, which he can dispose of as he pleases. It appears that a stage between tribal and feudal society is represented here, a combination of both systems which may have existed in this way for centuries, and which is largely primitive in character.

565
596

The aristocratic Kurdish households are, in fact, extended patrilineal families for which the term is mallin, parallel in its similarity to the Latin familia. The same term is sometimes applied to houses of great wealth and numbers, but this seems to be comparatively rare. Only those households and mallin, descendants of the tribe of the original, keep genealogies (sejara, from Arabic shajara, "tree"). In the case of the mallin the title can be inherited on either side, but the ground of nobility is solely patrilineal. One of the tests of nobility is said to be the ability to name one's patrilineal forebears to seven generations, and no one in Rowanduz, outside of these families, is able to perform this feat. The titles of the nobility include beg, agha, and sir, all of Turkish derivation. In Ottoman times pasha was also in use, and the grandfather of Isma'il Beg was called "Abdullah Pasha." The Arabic sheykh, literally, "old man," appears, as in such distinguished Kurdish figures as Sheykh Mahmud, leader of the revolts in 1919 and 1930, and Sheykh Taha,

[171]

61
565

85
554

no reason to believe, however, that such early prohibitions differed too greatly from those formulated by the Prophet. Specifically, it is forbidden for persons to marry their grandparents, parents, the brothers and sisters of their parents, and their own brothers and sisters. Further, 582 §34
using that polygyny is permitted, a man is prohibited from [595]
having two sisters as his wives. Only if one sister dies, [587]
is he permitted to wed the survivor. Finally, an infant whose mother cannot feed him is often given to a wet-nurse, 582 608 [553]
and this person, no matter what her status (in Rwanda she is typically a villager) becomes his "mother." In later life he is under the same restrictions toward her and her kindred as he is toward his own mother, for example, he can never marry her daughter. The townspeople of Rwanda provided rationalizations for some of these matters, and they are embedded here with little comment. The rule that a man could not be married to two sisters simultaneously was explained by the usage that a husband habitually addressed his parents-in-law as "father" and "mother," his brother-in-law as "brother," and his sister-in-law as "sister," although, as will be seen, there are also separate terms for relatives by marriage. A man cannot take the sister of his wife as a second wife, it was said, because it was as if she were his real "sister," so he called her. In Kwakiutl descent is commonly dis- 611 ●
cussed in two ways, through the blood (idzo) of the parents and through the skin (skig) of the mother. Since [553]

importance is attached to marriage, and the ultimate curse of a mother toward her offspring, the worst of wrongs, is the wish that her "milk should never have been a misfortune in his mouth." It is forbidden for children who have been nursed at the same breast to marry and for this reason a youth can never wed his foster-sister, the daughter of his wet-nurse. It must be noted that in selecting a wet nurse, one with whose daughter an exogamous marriage might be subsequently arranged is never sought, but rather some woman of the lower classes or of the villages. Neither of these explanations, nor a third, that of descent through "blood," can be expanded to explain the prohibition of marriage between two generations. To amplify this statement, one cannot marry his sister "because they have been nursed at the same breast," but the rationale does not apply to an aunt who is similarly forbidden.

Islamic law permits a man to take four wives if he so chooses. This, however, in its full realization presents many more obstacles than are immediately apparent. First, he must pay separate dowries for each spouse, and the dowry, as has been seen, as well as the feeding, clothing, and maintenance, of a single wife is not an inexpensive undertaking. Polygyny, then, is more often than not the prerogative of the extremely wealthy. At the same time, the threat to connubial happiness in maintaining two or more wives under the same roof is widely recognized in the Middle East, and there are many examples, in literature and in popular speech, of the intense jealousy developed in such a situation.

642 and so on ending at the village level. The leader of any category of group is called *Agha*, any branch or named section thereof will in certain contexts be called a *tira*.

The genealogy of these branches is traced, but varies somewhat from villages to village. Such variations derive partly from the lack of interest in collateral units, partly from an attempt to stress certain relationships or to construct a more flattering genealogy.

Descent is traced in male line from the common ancestor Hamma, the founder or the tira, nine generations removed from the present



Diagram No. 4. A Tergish model of their position in the Hamawand kinship organization.

adult group. The origins of Hamma, having no political significance in the group, are of little interest to the villagers, though Arabic origin is occasionally claimed for its prestige value.

One version was collected in the village of Kani Sarê: Hamma had 4 sons, Sellar, Yadjar, Rashid, and Rezzoue; from these are descended the 4 major branches of the group. The villagers themselves claim to be Yadjar. They could indicate the areas where the descendants of the three other sons live, but were unable or unconcerned in tracing relations in any greater detail.

In the village of Tergish, a somewhat different version was given. The major branches were named as Ramewand, Sefarewand, Rashe-

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 NAll Kurd NAll

wand, and Begzade. As will be noticed, the branch of Yadjar, to 411
which the Koni Sardo belong, is not in this list. The Koni Sardo 414
in fact belong to the Begzade branch, as either Yadjar is the ancestor 413
of all the Begzade, or a smaller segment category has been elevated
to the level of a major branch, for the greater glory of the Koni
Sard group. The villagers in Tazgah assert to belong to the Bablo-
wand division, again made up of the villagers from Tazgah and
Chishkachal, the latter now having been abandoned and the villagers
scattered. The Bablowand were derived from the Rashowand, in
unspecified fashion. A Tazgah model of their position in the tree
would then read as shown in Diagram No. 4.

The *Agha* of a village is appointed or granted power by the male 412
inhabitants of that village. In practice, the position is hereditary,
but not according to any rule of seniority, and village preference
undoubtedly influences the pattern of succession. The village *Agha*
has only the authority which follows from his own power and pres-
tige, and the goodwill of his followers.

The position as *Agha* of one of the four major branches is either similarly hereditary, or, all there is no suitable son of the old *Agha*, a new *Agha* is elected by the villagers. These *Aghas* will generally have the position and means to support a group of retainers, parallel-ing the *Pyalewale* of the *Jal Begs*. They thus have a vaguely insti-tutionalized mechanism to enforce their authority. Thus, though the formal position of the *Aghas* of the four major Hamawand seg-ments is unlike that of the *Jal Begzade*, the actual differences more reflect the difference in scale than in formal position.

Neither the *Jal* nor the Hamawand lineage organizations function 414
in the ideals pattern closely exemplified by the Cyrenaica Bedouin, discussed above. A position of authority and super-ordination does in fact become vested in the individual *Aghas* and *Kets*, who tends to apply coercive means to support such a hierarchy of authority. Though the ideal structure of the political structure is that of a segmentary lineage organization, the system does in fact function in a somewhat different pattern, as will be shown more fully later.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1955 MA11 Kurd MA11

6 2J
SJI

thus be considered an example of Murdock's *dense* type of community, that is, an endogamous, but unstructured localized kin group (Murdock 1949, p. 43).

Some of the interrelations between marriage patterns, kinship composition of local groups, and type of political organization are fairly clear. In the tribal political system, patrilineal descent is of considerable importance. Membership in the political unit itself depends on patrilineal descent and one gains prestige from belonging to particular segments of the larger lineage. As compared to the non-tribal village, the whole status system is considerably more elaborated, as one would expect in a traditional system. Since marriage, both according to Islamic law and general Kurdish values should be between equals, and since each lineage segment wishes to preserve its own status position (and may in fact tend to over-rate it), neither sex is willing to marry down in the social scale, and near-kin marriage is the reasonable solution. Most clear is the status equivalence of children of brothers, and FaBrDa becomes the preferred spouse.

This emphasis on equivalence is however only one factor inductive to a pattern of FaBrDa marriage. Perhaps more important is its political significance, briefly indicated previously.

A comparison of the tribal and non-tribal patterns may clarify this point. In the tribal system, power relations on the village level are more amenable to manipulation than in the non-tribal system, where most power is vested in the absentee landowner. At the same time, these power relations in the tribal village are defined in lineage and kinship terms. A man can only expect political support from his immediate agnatic relatives — those who by descent belong to his political sub-section — primarily brothers, sons, and brothers' sons, the relations to the latter being most critical. Political obligations can be reinforced in this group by giving them a daughter in marriage; conversely, the group would be alienated by being refused this daughter. The man who marries his daughter out of the lineage segment and takes a high bride-price for her thereby converts her into an economic asset, but also isolates himself from his agnatic relatives, his potential political supporters. He can then expect no support in a situation where actual power is important, such as in